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Abstract: This paper examines the consequences of various attitudes towards climate damages through a 
family of stochastic optimal control models (RESPONSE): cost-efficiency for a given temperature ceiling; cost-
benefit analysis with a “pure preference for current climate regime” and full cost-benefit analysis. The choice of 
a given proxy of climate change risks is actually more than a technical option. It is essentially motivated by the 
degree of distrust regarding the legitimacy of an assessment of climate damages and the possibility of providing 
in due time reliable and non controversial estimates. Our results demonstrate that a) for early decades abatement, 
the difference between various decision-making frameworks appears to matter less than the difference between 
stochastic and non stochastic approach given the cascade of uncertainty from emissions to damages; b) in a 
stochastic approach, the possibility of non-catastrophic singularities in the damage function is sufficient to 
significantly increase earlier optimal abatements; c) a window of opportunity for action exists up to 2040: 
abatements further delayed may induce significant regret in case of bad news about climate response or 
singularities in damages. 
 
 
keywords: cost-efficiency, cost-benefit, climate sensitivity, climate change damages, 
uncertainty, optimal climate policy, decision making frameworks. 
 
* corresponding author. e-mail : ambrosi@centre-cired.fr; tel : +33 1 43 94 73 87 ; fax : +33 1 43 94 73 70. 
 1 
1. Introduction 
 
Little progress has been made since 1992 on what constitutes a “dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system” [1]. The Third Assessment Report (TAR) of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) delivered new material on climate 
change impacts but did not venture to deliver any conclusive judgment [2]. In this context, 
which decision-making framework should be used to design climate policies remains an open 
question (see [3] (chap. 1&2) and [4] (chap. 10) for a survey). Bounded cost; minimax regret; 
maximin gain; minimax loss; cost-effectiveness, tolerable windows and safe landing 
approaches; cost-benefit analysis, each with its own merits and limitations, are representative 
of the diversity of decision-making attitudes in a sea of uncertainty [5]. 
 
The objective of this paper is to assess how each of these attitudes translates in terms of 
timing of emissions abatement. It is achieved through the use of optimal control models, 
which can put some rationale into pending controversies and thus facilitate the emergence of 
compromises because they are apt to disentangle the sources of misunderstandings from the 
real division lines. Indeed they force the analyst to a) identify the pathways through which 
climate change may impact on global welfare; b) clarify the proxies that are used to capture 
the benefits of climate action, and against which the costs of this action are to be weighted 
and c) make explicit the level of confidence about scientific information and the ethical 
choices which underpin the selection of a given framework. Hence, after having discussed 
(section 2) how various attitudes towards climate change lead to various metrics to capture the 
benefits of climate policies we successively analyze the optimal abatement pathway derived 
from (section 3) a cost-effectiveness analysis of temperature ceiling objectives, (section 4) a 
cost-benefit analysis using a pure preference for current climate regime and (section 5) a cost-
benefit approach using a monetized quantification of damages. 
 
 
2. Metrics for assessing benefits of climate policies 
 
IPCC TAR indicates that global mean temperature is projected to increase by 1.4 to 5.8°C 
over the period 1990 to 2100 as a consequence of greenhouse gases anthropogenic emissions. 
 
Faced with such a large uncertainty range, debates about the application of the Precautionary 
Principle come to select specific metrics of the benefits of climate policies. The selection of 
such metrics is certainly motivated by value judgments, but it is not independent from the 
degree of distrust regarding the possibility of timely providing reliable and non controversial 
estimates. Attitudes can be grouped into three broad categories: 
 
a) A first one considers that the uncertainty about climate impacts and damages is so 
high that they cannot be confidently assigned any numerical value; environmental benefits are 
thus set in the form of arbitrary ceilings on either greenhouse gases (GHGs) concentration, 
temperature, or any other multidimensional indicator. Approaches such as a safe corridor, a 
safe landing or a viability path also belong to this cost-efficiency framework; their outcome 
depends obviously on whether the constraints are set by a convinced ecologist or by a 
skeptical ecologist (à la Lomborg). Sharing the same distrust about predictions of climate 
impacts, the convinced and the skeptical ecologist may search for a reasoned compromise, 
and agree on a sequential decision-making process in which an initial trajectory can be 
adapted in the light of new information. This common will to consider several conceivable 
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futures and to keep open alternative options leads to substitute a stochastic to a deterministic 
cost-efficiency model. 
 
b) Another attitude refuses the arbitrary setting of absolute targets and demands a cost-
benefit analysis; however, being skeptic about explicit prediction and assessment of damages, 
it does not use an itemized assessment of these damages but a willingness to pay for avoiding 
various levels of climate change. In modeling terms, this is translated through the inclusion of 
climate change indicators (temperature or rainfall patterns, extreme events) in the utility 
function to express a pure preference for current climate regime (PCCR). This PCCR 
conveys precautionary ethics leading to favoring the current climate regime over unknown 
alternatives; it incorporates psychological motivations about endangered habitats, the amenity 
or bequest value of landscapes, all values considered a part of climate policy benefits in the 
absence of definition of climate feedbacks on economic productivity. Depending on the 
specification of the utility function, the environment appears (or does not appear) as a superior 
good (a good to which agents dedicate a growing share of their income as they become 
richer). 
 
c) The last attitude leads also to the carrying out of a cost-benefit analysis but requires 
an itemized monetary assessment of impacts. This assessment confronts uncertainty of impact 
predictions and raises controversies1 about monetary valuation (such as placing a monetary 
value on human life in different countries or aggregating regional estimates assuming a 
compensation hypothesis). Many perform such an assessment though, for lack of anything 
better, to place some rationale into policy debates about long term targets, be it to convince 
public opinion to accept subsequent unpopular measures or to resist disproportionate demands 
from environmentalists. 
 
Hence, the choice of a metrics of the benefits from mitigation policies is actually much more 
than a mere technical option. It reflects a judgement on the quality of the available 
information and on its ability to serve as a common basis in the negotiation process. In other 
words, it implies a trade-off between accuracy and relevance [8]: accuracy because the further 
down we move along the causal chain linking GHGs emissions to climate change damages, 
the less confidence we place in our ability to predict the outcome of the cascade of 
uncertainties we are faced with; relevance because the further up we proceed from damages 
functions to GHGs concentrations ceilings, the further we get from a precise description of 
climate change consequences, in particular with regard to welfare and distributive aspects.  
 
To compare the policy implications of these attitudes, we have performed a set of harmonized 
numerical experiments based on the RESPONSE model family. RESPONSE is an aggregate 
optimal control integrated model which include reduced forms of carbon cycle and climate 
dynamics. Using a sequential decision-making framework, we focus on the sensitivity of first 
period decisions to the combination of uncertainties about climate change consequences, and 
to the choice of one of the three metrics described above. 
 
These experiments have been conducted for a single baseline growth scenario (the marker of 
A1 SRES) and set of abatement cost curves. The specification of the abatement cost function 
is meant to capture the role of socio-economic inertia as a cost multiplier; it incorporates an 
autonomous technological change factor (see Appendix A). 
                                                 
1For instance, the forum on valuation of ecosystem services (Ecological Economics, 1998. 25(1)) which has been 
emulated by Costanza on the basis of [6]. Many respondents have indeed pointed out the risk of underestimating 
the environment as Toman [7] elegantly puts it: “a serious underestimate of infinity”. 
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The objective functions only differ among variants of the model: 
- RESPONSE_T (T for temperature) explores the first attitude and minimizes the 
discounted sum of abatement costs with respect to an environmental constraint on global 
mean temperature rise; 
- RESPONSE_P (P for preference for current climate regime) explores the second 
attitude and maximizes the intertemporal welfare derived from both consumption and the 
amenity value of climate; 
- RESPONSE_D (D for damages) explores the third attitude and maximizes the 
intertemporal welfare derived from consumption minus abatement expenditures and resulting 
damages. 
General specifications of RESPONSE will be introduced in the following section with 
the description of RESPONSE_T (both in deterministic and stochastic versions); for the 
remaining sections, we will solely describe the specific differences (with respect to the 
generic model) of the version we refer to. 
 
 
3. Lessons from a stochastic cost-efficiency analysis: RESPONSE_T  
 
Up to Kyoto, efforts to clarify controversies about the timing of GHGs abatements have been 
conducted through a cost-efficiency analysis within a sequential decision framework enabling 
to adjust an initial response in the light of new information [9]. Whereas a delay in the bulk of 
abatement efforts is justified if a given GHGs concentration target is known in advance [10], 
an earlier and higher departure from baseline emissions trends is required if the same, say 550 
ppm target, is considered as the mean of three yet unknown values (say 450 ppm, 550 ppm 
and 650 ppm) and if information about the real value is expected to be disclosed some 
decades in the future [9]. Two main results emerge from this analysis which remain relevant 
whatever the attitude towards climate risks: 
a) the role of the interplay between uncertainty about the ultimate target and the inertia 
of technical and environmental systems: without inertia, transition costs of switching from 
one emission path to another would be null, and uncertainty would not matter; in fact, inertia 
raises both the costs of premature abatement and that of accelerated abatement if stronger 
action is called for later; 
b) the value of the discount rate matters less than 1) the set of probabilities placed on 
the targets, and, more specifically the weight given to the tightest one and 2) the date of 
resolution of uncertainty: the later this uncertainty is to be resolved, the earlier the abatement 
efforts have to be scheduled. 
 
Whereas a cost-efficiency analysis of concentration ceilings is policy relevant because it 
follows the very language of the UNFCCC, it is a poor proxy of the benefits of climate action. 
More specifically it does not allow for considering the uncertainty regarding climate 
sensitivity. This parameter is defined as the global mean surface temperature increase at the 
equilibrium, when CO2 concentration is kept constant at twice the pre-industrial level. 
Literature sets this parameter between +1.5 °C and +4.5°C [11] (chp. IX). 
 
This is why it is attractive to carry out a cost-efficiency analysis of temperature ceilings. 
RESPONSE_T performs such an analysis through an objective function (1a) minimizing the 
discounted sum of abatement costs (a surrogate of a utility-maximization model where 
consumption is lowered by mitigation measures), with as environmental constraint (1b) a 
ceiling on the global mean temperature rise relative to its 1990 value.  
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with: f(.) the abatement cost function 
Abt the abatement rate at time t (% of baseline emissions) 
ρ the discount rate (5%.year-1) 
θt the global mean temperature rise at time t 
∆θMAX the constraint on global mean temperature rise relative to 1990 
 
The carbon cycle (2) is taken from William Nordhaus [12]: it is a linear three-reservoir model 
which describes carbon accumulation and transportation between the atmosphere, the 
biosphere (oceanic and continental) and deep ocean. The model accounts for some inertia in 
natural processes. Related parameters (transfer coefficients and initial conditions) are given in 
Appendix A.  
1 . (1 )t trans t t tM C M Ab emδ+ = + −   (2) 
with: Mt the carbon contents of each reservoir at time t, a column vector 
 Ctrans the net transfer coefficients matrix, a 3x3 matrix 
 δ the time step of the model (10 years) 
emt the baseline carbon dioxide emissions at time t, exogenous (A1-m scenario) 
u a column vector (1,0,0) 
 
Lastly, variations in global mean temperature derive from a two-box climate model (3) 
describing the modification of the thermal equilibrium between atmosphere and ocean in 
response to enhanced greenhouse effect (carbon dioxide only) based on specifications close to 
Nordhaus’s one [12]. To improve the quality of the insight on the timing of abatement over 
the short run, we calibrated this model in such a way that it gives a better description of 
warming over forthcoming decades: we prioritize the description of the interaction between 
the atmosphere and the superficial ocean neglecting interactions with the deep ocean. A 
thorough description is provided in appendix A. 
1 ( , )t tL Mθ θ+ =     (3) 
 
The model defined by equations (1), (2) and (3) can be run on a perfect information mode 
(RESPONSE_T/c) and on an uncertainty mode (RESPONSE_T/s). In the second option, 
uncertainty on climate sensitivity is discrete : we consider three possible states of the world 
(s) in which climate sensitivity may be {2.5°C;3.5°C;4.5°C} with the corresponding ex ante 
subjective probabilities (ps) {1/6;2/3;1/6}. Information arrives at a fixed time in the future 
(tinfo). The program solves a set of three parallel problems – three equations (2) and (3) 
representing three alternative states of the world; climate dynamics (3) is notably dependent 
on the value of climate sensitivity. The objective function (1a) is re-specified as the 
minimization of expected costs of abatement paths: 
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Environmental constraint (1b) is rewritten to consider each state of the world: ( )1990. . . stw r t θ θ θ− ≤    (1b) 
Additional constraints (1c) are added to impose that, before the disclosure of information, 
decision variables be the same across all states of the world: 
( ) 'inf , , ' , so tt t s s S Ab Ab∀ ≤ ∀ ∈ =   (1c) 
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Model solutions correspond technically to perfect information when tinfo =1990, imperfect 
information with learning when (1990<tinfo <2300), absolute uncertainty when tinfo =2300. 
 
Let us start from a +2°C target2 with respect to 1990. It corresponds to an expected value of 
500 ppm for GHGs concentration, actually shifting from a very stringent 440 ppm when 
climate sensitivity is set to its upper value to a very lax 590 ppm when climate sensitivity is at 
its lower value. A +1°C and +3°C target would respectively lead to a 379-448 ppm range 
(expected value: 408ppm) and to a 515-780 ppm range (expected value: 617ppm) for 
concentration ceiling.  
 
It appears that for a +2°C target, and assuming that information on the value of climate 
sensitivity arrives in 2020, the earlier periods optimal emissions path is very close to the one 
consistent with the most pessimistic hypothesis about this value (Figure 1). When compared 
with results obtained with GHGs concentration ceilings, the dominance of the worst case 
hypothesis is reinforced: pessimistic assumptions regarding climate sensitivity lead to a 
tighter constraint (440 ppm) and, more importantly, implie that the + 2°C temperature ceiling 
is reached as early as 2050 in the baseline case. Consequently, the model accounts for the fact 
that any delay in climate policy will result in a costly acceleration of GHG abatement. 
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Figure 1: Hedging strategies for a given +2°C temperature ceiling : with perfect information 
(grey dashed line) and with uncertainties (black continue line). 
 
A good indicator of the environmental irreversibility is captured by the value of information 
on climate sensitivity. The Expected Value of Perfect Information (EVPI) is classically the 
difference between the expected value of the objective function in the “Learn then Act” 
(climate sensitivity known from the outset and policy adopted consequently) and in the “Act 
then Learn” (a policy must be adopted before the value of this parameter is revealed) [16]. 
Logically, the later the date of resolution of uncertainty the higher the EVPI. Before 2040 
                                                 
2 This figure is circulated in many studies such as the Global Fast Track Assessment [13] where the additional 
number of people at risk of water shortage increases sharply once global mean temperature rise gets close to 
+2°C. [14] also suggests that a +2°C temperature increase dramatically reduces suitable areas for Robusta coffee 
in Uganda. Note that this target is less binding than former EU long-term climate goals [15], amounting to a 
maximum +2°C global mean temperature rise wrt preindustrial level. 
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(Figure 2), it increases linearly up to 13% of its final value and then sharply between 2040 
and 2070 to reach 83% of this value. To give a comparative benchmark, the expected value of 
discounted abatement costs over the three states of the world in the Learn then Act hypothesis 
would amount almost to 52 percentage points in the same metrics. Such a high opportunity 
cost of knowing climate sensitivity before 2040 highlights the risk of postponing too much a 
serious hedging strategy in case of pessimistic prospects about the progress in scientific 
knowledge and public awareness of climate risks 
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Figure 2 : Expected Value of Perfect Information with respect to the date of resolution of 
uncertainty on climate sensitivity. Information value raises brutally after 2040, that means 
there is a significant interest in revealing this value before this date [17]. 
 
The main criticism addressed to a stochastic cost-efficiency analysis is that it gives too high a 
weight to the tightest constraint. The set of probabilities can be indeed interpreted either in 
terms of subjective probabilities or in terms of shares in a population of subgroups advocating 
for a given constraint. In the latter case the program comes to find a compromise between 
competing views of the world. But a minority, say a fringe of 10% of the population, arguing 
for a 390 ppm target, would automatically exert a disproportionate influence on decision 
because costs of postponing action for this target tend towards infinity. 
 
In practice though, faced with such a situation, societies would overshoot the ceiling at the 
risk of some damages admitting that a window of opportunity has been missed [18], rather 
than bear the social costs of an exaggerated deceleration of emissions. The necessity of 
examining such trade-off is the main argument for shifting from cost-efficiency analysis to 
some form of cost-benefit approach. 
 
 
4. The Pure Preference for the Current Climate Regime: RESPONSE_P 
 
As explained in section 2, the first form of cost-benefit analysis, consistent with an attitude of 
distrust regarding any numerical assessment of damages, considers a willingness to pay for 
mitigating climate change and a pure preference for current climate regime (PCCR).  
 
Let U(.) denote the utility function. Ct denotes current consumption level; climate change is 
expressed by global mean temperature rise, θ t. We specify U(.) such as 
( ) ( ) (, ln .t t t tU C C )βθ θ= −θ  with 0 < (1< )Ct and , 0 1t β< <θ θ . < θ  denotes an absolute 
threshold beyond which climate change impacts would be overbearingly disruptive; we 
arbitrarily set this parameter to +4°C (keeping in mind that such a warming on a global scale 
would imply, in some regions, a warming greater than +6°C, that is to say tremendous local 
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climatic shocks). With this specification, willingness to pay increases with the expected level 
of climate change. Moreover, the preservation of the current climate regime is treated as a 
superior good. This point can be quickly verified. Let WTP(θ) be the maximum amount of 
current income we are willing to pay to prevent a climate change of magnitude θ: 
( ) ( ) ( )ln( ). ln ( ) .C C WTPβ βθ θ θ θ− = −  leading to ( )P C CWT
βθ θ
θθ
 −   = −  
Hence, marginal willingness to pay is: 
1
( ) ln 0WTP C C
ββ θ θ
θθ β θ θ
θ θ θ
−  −    ∂ −= > ∂  
 
Therefore WTP(θ) is a growing function of temperature change θ. 
 
Let π(θ) denote the ratio between WTP(θ) and income. We have: 
( ) 1( ) 1WTP C
C
βθ θ
θθπ θ
 − −   = = −  leading to ( ) 21 0C
C
βθ θ
θ
βπ θ θ θ
θ
 − −     ∂ − = − − >  ∂   
 
Thus, for the same climate change magnitude θ, π(θ) is an increasing function of income: 
climate protection is a superior good. 
 
So far no opinion polls exist on the willingness to pay for climate stability; would they 
though, their results would be very sensitive to the political and/or media life cycles that 
determine the way information is conveyed to public opinion [19]. A more secure approach is 
to reveal the implicit utility function behind figures circulating about the reasonable 
maximum value for temperature change (for example +2°C in the Energy Modeling Forum 
ongoing round or for some NGOs). To do so, for each value of pure time preference (PTP), 
we can determine the elasticity of utility w. r. t. climate regime (β) that exactly balances the 
marginal welfare impacts of consumption and climate amenity value along the optimal 
abatement trajectories obtained for this target in the certainty case: practically, for this value 
of β, the marginal welfare impact of the consumption loss resulting from a tightening of the 
environmental objective from +2.05°C to +1.95°C is exactly compensated by the marginal 
welfare improvement due to lower temperatures. This procedure ensures consistency between 
claims for a given target and expectations on baseline emissions, abatement costs and climate 
sensitivity. For example, for a given abatement cost curve, a +2°C ceiling implies higher 
mitigation costs under high climate sensitivity. Sticking to this objective thus implies a higher 
WTP for climate protection than if one expects low climate sensitivity (see table 1). 
 
Climate sensitivity 2.5°C 3.5°C 4.5°C 
PTP = 1%.year-1 1.4 10-4 7.7 10-4 13.8 10-4 
PTP = 3%.year-1 2.7 10-4 16.4 10-4 34.4 10-4 
Table 1: Parameter β values in function of climate sensitivity and pure time preference 
 
An important feature of the new program which maximizes U(.,.) without absolute constraint 
on the quality of the environment, is that an overshoot is now allowed in case of delayed 
action: this occurs if the cost of maintaining the temperature below the desired target is 
greater than the marginal WTP to avoid extra warming.  
 
In RESPONSE_P/c all equations and model specifications remain identical to 
RESPONSE_T/c except the objective function which is re-specified as the maximization of an 
intertemporal utility function (1): 
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( ) ( ) (2300 1 1990
1990
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ln
t
t t t t
t t
Ab t t
Y f Ab Ab t
Max N c e
N
β ηθ θ− − −
=
 −  −  
∑ )   (1) 
with Nt the population level (source A1-m) 
Yt the gross world product (source A1-m) 
c the propensity to consume (0.8) 
β the elasticity of utility w. r. t. climate regime (see Table 1) 
η the pure time preference (1 or 3%.year-1, corresponding to 3 and 5%.year-1 
discount rate in RESPONSE_T/c) 
 
In a deterministic mode, it is first remarkable that there is no overshoot beyond a +2°C target 
for a 1% pure time preference, even in the most pessimistic value for climate sensitivity 
(results not shown here). A moderate overshoot (up to 0.15°C) during 50 years3 is found with 
a pure time preference as high as 3% (Figure 3). Second, the model does not advocate lower 
abatement in the first periods: up to 2020 mitigation costs are twice as high as in a cost-
efficiency framework. This paradox, noted by Hammitt [8], can be easily explained: in a cost-
efficiency framework, agents give a high value to climate (the costate variable at a given point 
in time) only when the target is approached whereas in our PCCR approach, climate change is 
given a significant value by current generations. As time passes, future (and richer) 
generations give a higher value to it since it is a superior good.  
0
0,5
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1990 2020 2050 2080 2110 2140
High Climate sensitivity
Low Climate sensitivity
Central Climate sensitivity
Figure 3 : Global mean temperature increase for 3 climate sensitivities: in a cost-benefit 
analysis with Pure Preference for Climate Current Regime based on a desired 2°C target 
(full curve) and in a cost-efficiency analysis with a 2°C target (dotted curve). 
 
Let us now turn to a situation where, given the mandate of staying below a +2°C target for an 
expected +3.5°C value of climate sensitivity, the central planner calibrates the β coefficient 
accordingly (β= βC =0.00164) and considers the resulting utility function as expressing the 
real preferences of the population. But +3.5°C is only the mean of three possible values and as 
information arrives, climate sensitivity is set to its true value whereas the value of β is not 
revised. 
 
This is captured by RESPONSE_P/s in which uncertainty on climate sensitivity specifications 
is similar to RESPONSE_T/s. RESPONSE_P/s parallels RESPONSE_P/c except its objective 
                                                 
3 That figure should be considered cautiously because of the short-term calibration of the temperature model. 
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function which we specify such as the maximization of expected utility across the probability 
distribution of the three possible states of the world: 
( ) ( ) (2300 1 1990
1990
( , , )
ln
C
s
t
s s
t t t ts
s t t
Ab s t t
Y f Ab Ab t
Max p N c e
N
β ηθ θ− − −
=
 −  −  
∑ ∑ )
s
t t
  (1a) 
Additional constraints (1b) are added to impose that, before the disclosure of information, 
decision variables be the same across all states of the world: 
( ) 'inf , , ' , sot t s s S Ab Ab∀ ≤ ∀ ∈ =      (1b) 
 
For a resolution of uncertainty as late as 2080, the optimal response leads to a +0.7°C 
overshoot if climate sensitivity is finally +4.5°C (dotted grey curve, Figure 4). This has to be 
compared to the modest overshoot in the certainty case (+0.1°C) (black thin curve, Figure 4). 
However, this overshoot does not mean an absence of action: the simulation shows a very 
significant deviation from the global mean temperature increase in the baseline scenario (bold 
black curve, Figure 4). 
 
0
1
2
3
4
1990 2010 2030 2050 2070 2090
Overshoot (0.7°C)
Perfect information
Learning on climate sensitivity
(occurs in 2080)
Baseline A1m
Desired target=+2°C
Figure 4 : Comparing the cost of misestimating belief on climate change damages and 
climate dynamics. In all cases, climate sensitivity has a high value. Global mean temperature 
increase for baseline case (bold black curve), for optimal strategy with perfect information 
(thin black curve) and for optimal strategy with learning on climate sensitivity (grey curve). 
 
Consistently, under this pessimistic assumption regarding climate sensitivity, mitigation costs 
in the Kyoto commitment period are significantly lower in the learning case (β=16.4 10-4) 
than in the perfect information case (β=34.4 10-4): 0.02 % of GWP to be compared with 0.08 
% of GWP. Sensitivity tests about the date of arrival of information on climate sensitivity 
show that mitigation costs around 2010 are remarkably constant and that the learning date has 
no dramatic influence on the magnitude of the overshoot, which varies from +0.6°C (early 
learning) to +0.7°C (late learning). These results suggest that the difference between β values 
dominates uncertainty regarding climate sensitivity. 
 
The key question remains the real magnitude of WTP and its variations amongst regions 
depending on preferences and income level. At a regional level, such a PCCR analysis would 
enable to scrutinize compensation schemes between countries necessary to reach a consensus 
on a global temperature target. Some regions might indeed be willing to adopt a very low 
temperature ceiling corresponding to a global constraint too tight to be agreed upon at an 
international level. Would this global constraint be slackened, these regions would 
understandably demand for compensations. 
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5. Key issues with the strong form of cost-benefit analysis  
 
Some authors are reluctant to resort to a cost benefit-analysis because, they claim, discounting 
cannot but underestimate the value of environmental damages and thus jeopardize future 
generations welfare. This seems the case in the few existing cost-benefit analyses (see the 
EMF review [20]), which univocally advocate a slow departure from current emission trends 
unless ‘bad news’ regarding climate damages appear. 
 
Contrary to a PCCR approach, where environmental variations affect welfare in the first 
periods, climate impacts occur only several decades after mitigation efforts are undertaken 
and, once discounted, marginal benefits of those actions are easily outweighed by their costs. 
This is the reason why a zero coefficient for pure time preference (PTP) has been argued [21]. 
But this option faces serious problems. First, as shown by Koopmans [22], time consistent 
decision-making over infinite consumption plans requires a strictly positive PTP. In addition, 
introducing a zero or very low PTP in a growth model entails high savings and low 
consumption for the current (and poorest) generation. This is arguably not consistent with 
intergenerational equity. 
 
This paper does not address the alternative proposals suggested in the literature to avoid the 
sacrifice of both current and future generations (e.g. [23]). Despite their interest, such 
proposals either raise serious dynamic consistency problems or do not change the response 
much for the early periods [24]. We rather concentrate on the interplay between conventional 
discounting and expectations regarding the shape of the damage function, future economic 
growth and future emissions. To this aim, we introduce a zero PCCR (β=0). Prior to 
discussing our results, which are mainly derived from numerical experiments, we present an 
analytical model to better understand the interplay between discount rate and the shape of the 
damage function, and demonstrate the importance on short term response of three parameters 
other than the shape of damage curve and discount rate: growth assumptions and emissions 
scenario, short term climate response and abatement cost functions. 
 
5.1. Interplay between discount rate and the shape of the damage function 
 
Let us start from a simple two-period decision model. At date t1, a first decision is made to 
spend c1 in abatement expenditures; in the same way, we spend c2 in abatement expenditures 
at date t2. Resulting damages, D(c1,c2), befall at a posterior point in time. We define ϕ (the 
discount factor) as ρ+=11ϕ , ρ being the social discount rate. 
 
The planner’s optimal abatement schedule is solution of the following cost minimization 
problem, with n the number of years between t1 and t2 and m the distance between t1 and the 
time at which damages occur (m>n): 
1 2
1 2 1,
( , )n m
c c
Min c c D c cϕ ϕ+ + 2  
 
The relationship between the slope of the damage function and the impact of the discount rate 
can be illustrated analytically by decomposing the damage function in two terms: an indicator 
of impacts θ(c1,c2) and a damage function per se Ψ(θ): 
D(c1,c2)= Ψ[θ(c1,c2)] 
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For illustrative purposes, let us assume that θ(.,.) has the following form, where α is strictly 
lower than unity to capture decreasing environmental return of abatement: 
θ (c1,c2) = a.c1α + b.c2α 
 
The optimal abatement policy, (c*1, c*2) satisfies the following conditions: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1* *
1
1* *
2
m
n m
a c
b c
α
θ
α
θ
α θ
α θ
− −
− −
 Ψ = − Ψ = −
ϕ
ϕ
 where  
( )
( )* *1 2
.
,c c
θ θ
θ θ
∂ΨΨ ≡ ∂ = *
 
 
Under the above assumptions, a rapid calculus shows that the variation of optimal first-period 
abatement when the discount rate varies from ρ to ρ’ is as follows (where ’ denotes the values 
of the variables for the alternative optimum): 
( )
( )
1
*' 1*' 1
1
* *
1
1
1 '
m
c
c
αα θ
θ
ψ θρ
ρ ψ θ
−−   +  = ⋅   +   
 
If damages are linear in the environmental indicator (i.e. if ψθ(θ) is constant) then the 
variation of first-period abatement becomes:  
*' 1
1
*
1
1
1 '
m
c
c
αρ
ρ
− +=  +   
If α=1/3 (which corresponds to quadratic marginal abatement costs) and m=100 years, a 1% 
increase of the discount rate implies a 76% decrease in first period marginal abatement costs. 
 
But if marginal damages vary with the environmental indicator (Ψ(θ) = θ-k), the variation of 
first period abatement becomes 
1
1
*' 11
1
*
1 1
1 1 '
1 '
1
k
nm k
n
c
c
α α
αα
α
α
ρ ξθ
ρ ξθ
+
− +
−−
−
−
  + += ⋅  +   + 
    with 
1
1b
a
α−
 ξ
 =    
If k=5 and b/a = 2 (technical change makes abatement twice less costly in the second period), 
the optimal first-period abatement diminishes only by 17% when the discount rate rises by 
1%. Even if k=1 (quadratic damage function), first period abatement diminishes only by 45%. 
The impact of the discount rate on early decades abatement is thus strongly dependent on the 
interplay between the indicator of climate change and the damage function. 
 
5.2. Importance of parameters other than the shape of damage curve  
 
This critical role comes back again when comparing results from Dixit and Pyndick [25] on 
the one hand and Narain and Fisher [26] or Gjerde [27] on the other hand. Comparing the 
environmental irreversibility effect and the investment irreversibility effect, the former, using 
a real-option model, conclude to the dominance of the investment irreversibility effect in the 
case of a linear damage function, whereas the latters, including an avoidable climatic 
catastrophe in the analysis, find an opposite result. However, given the likely controversies 
about the shape of the damage function it would be misleading to focus on this sole parameter 
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despite its critical significance. Three other key determinants of the timing of abatements are 
indeed of significance: a) the underlying growth scenario which dictates the level of the 
discount rate and the emissions baseline; b) the short term response of climate system to a 
given inflow of carbon and c) the abatement costs. 
 
To demonstrate the importance of these determinants, we will introduce the following 
modifications in the DICE model ([12],[28]) while keeping its quadratic damages function of 
temperature rise4: 
- we use the A1 SRES scenario as the baseline emissions (10.88 GtC and 12.64 GtC 
emissions in 2010 and 2020) instead of the DICE baseline which is very close to the B2 SRES 
scenario (8.78 GtC and 9.05 GtC emissions in 2010 and 2020 respectively),  
- we modify the short term climate response (θ(c1,c2)). DICE two-box climate model 
provides a fair description of long-term climate change but underestimates short term 
atmospheric temperature rise because of the specification of upper and lower compartments 
(atmosphere and superficial ocean, deep ocean). This is not the case with the climate model 
presented in Appendix A: though similar to the one in DICE, it has been calibrated so as to 
describe more precisely short-term climate change. 
- we retain a marginal abatement cost curve as exposed in Appendix A. The 
specification is quadratic and accounts for socio-economic inertia. It leads to an equivalent 
burden for 2010 (0,35% of GWP as compared to 0,36% of GWP following DICE 
specifications) but with a moderately lower price of carbon: 60$/tC instead of 75$/tC. 
 
Figure 5 demonstrates that changing the specification θ(c1,c2) or choosing an alternative 
emissions baseline raises abatement rates in 2015 from 5.6% to 7.2% (resp. 5.6% to 8.6%). 
When both effects are combined, the abatement rate variation is increased by 50% (from 5.6% 
to 8.6%). It is more than doubled (from 5.6% to 12.5%) if abatement costs are 20% lower. 
 
These results do not pretend to be conclusive about the validity of the Kyoto Protocol. They 
simply underline that, even without singularity in damage functions, the optimal level of 
departure from current trends is sensitive to the description of short term climate response and 
emissions trends, in addition to the value of the discount rate. 
 
                                                 
4We used DICE99 version available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/%7Enordhaus/homepage/dice_section_IV.html 
Damage function is polynomial of degree 2. Both coefficients are positive so they do not allow for global 
benefits of climate change for low temperature change. Benchmark corresponds to a 1.5% GWP loss for a 2.5°C 
global mean temperature rise. Furthermore, the argument of DICE-99 damages function is global mean 
temperature rise since 1900. To keep results comparable, we reformulated DICE including the following 
modification: the argument of the damages function becomes global mean temperature rise relative to the first 
period of the model (1995).  
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Figure 5: Abatement rate for DICE and for DICE including the modified temperature model 
(“temp”), a different baseline (“EmA1”), both former modifications (“temp+EmA1”) and 
finally same than before with the new cost curve (“temp+EmA1+cost”). 
 
5.3. Interplay between the shape of damage curve and climate sensitivity 
 
Let us now turn to the numerical analysis of the linkages between the timing of GHGs 
abatement, the value of the discount rate and that of the time derivative of damages which are 
critical for early decades actions (see 5.1). This raises the question of singularities triggered 
by the interplay between climate change θ(.) and the responses of environmental and socio-
economic systems ψ(.). 
 
Recently, concerns about such singularities have been evoked beyond environmentalist 
quarters5: “[My] biggest fear is that international policy is being made based on smooth 
climate change” (G. Yohe). It is hardly disputable that potential sources of abrupt impacts 
exist along the chain from global warming to changes in local ecosystems. Large scale 
catastrophic events are the most obvious examples: slow-down of the thermohaline circulation 
in the North Atlantic, transformation of monsoons patterns or of El Niño cycles. Local climate 
surprises may also be triggered by smooth evolutions as soon as a threshold is exceeded: for 
example coral reefs could experience severe bleaching episodes due to a warming of sea 
surface temperature. 
 
But one major layer of uncertainty lies in the very translation from impacts to losses in social 
welfare. On the one hand, archaeologists [30] establish coincidences between sudden climate 
shifts and deep societal mutations; on the other hand, it can be argued that technologically 
advanced societies are far more resilient. But this response in turn shows that damages depend 
strongly on the mobilization of adaptation capacities, among which compensations between 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’. For example, variation of crops productivity, triggered by changes in 
temperature, CO2 concentration, rainfall regime or soil degradation, will also depend upon the 
capacity to invest in water management systems in affected regions and/or to cover the basic 
needs of their populations through an accessible world market. In the same way, higher 
frequency of extreme events may aggravate the vulnerability of countries with fragile socio-
                                                 
5 The Boston Globe (December, 12 2002) on the occasion of the publication announcement of the National 
Academies report “Abrupt climate change: inevitable surprises” [29]. 
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economic systems; for example the political disorganization in Guatemala cannot be fully 
isolated from the catastrophes that have been affecting this country in the past several years. 
 
5.3.1. Smooth vs threshold function: levels and rates of climate damages  
 
A review of the main shortcomings of widely-used impact functions can be found in [2] 
(chap. XIX). In the perspective of analyzing short-term response to climate change, the main 
drawbacks of these functions can be exemplified with the DICE-94 damage function [28]. 
This function is close to , where θ stands for global mean temperature rise since 1900 
(benchmark estimate is a 1.33 % GWP loss for a +3°C global mean temperature increase; for 
a
( ) 21 aa θ
2=2, we obtain a1=1.33/9). Base value of a2=2 has greatly influenced previous studies. But 
such a function has three intrinsic drawbacks: 
- climate surprises leading to high GWP losses can only be represented by adopting 
unrealistically high global mean temperature rise values. As an example, referring to DICE-94 
damage function, the global mean temperature rise corresponding to a 10% GWP loss (which 
is higher than the economic shock of WWI) amounts to more than +8°C.  
- if a higher exponent is selected so as to lower the global mean temperature rise 
corresponding to this 10% GWP loss (for a2=4, this rise is +5°C), this leads to the paradoxical 
consequence that the larger the long-term damages, the smaller the short term ones (because 
of an increased convexity). 
- lastly, multiplying the scale parameter of the damage function (a1) to get more 
realistic damages on the short term (without altering the convexity of the function) also 
quickly leads to unrealistic high damages on the longer term. 
 
One technical option allowing to represent the episodes of very significant damages without 
assuming unrealistic temperature increases is the use of sigmoid-like functional forms [31]. 
To carry out simulations comparable with our previous cost-efficiency analysis, we set the 
middle of the threshold to +2°C (with a transition range from 1.7°C to 2.3°C). The maximum 
damage plateaus at a 4% GWP loss. 
 
To clarify the interplay of assumptions regarding the shape of damage functions with climate 
sensitivity, we compare in this section how, given the uncertainty on climate sensitivity, the 
timing of mitigation policies is affected by the specification of damage functions (threshold vs 
quadratic). In the next section, we perform a set of complementary simulations where climate 
sensitivity is known (set to its central value) whereas damages are subject to beliefs on the 
occurrence of singular events. 
 
5.3.2 Threshold vs quadratic function under climate dynamics uncertainty: RESPONSE_D 
 
Let us first note that, under assumption of singularities in the damage curve, climate 
sensitivity determines the period at which the time derivative of damages becomes higher than 
the discount rate. This is demonstrated in Figures 6 and 7: the 4% GWP loss is reached in 
2050 or 2100, depending upon assumptions on climate sensitivity. 
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Let us now consider three possible states of the world (s) in which climate sensitivity may be 
{2.5°C;3.5°C;4.5°C} with the corresponding ex ante subjective probabilities (ps) = 
{1/6;2/3;1/6}. The resolution of the uncertainty may occur at different points in time during 
the 21st century (tinfo). Damage functional forms are assumed to be known in each simulation 
and are either quadratic or sigmoid. They have been calibrated so that their total expected 
damages follow comparable trajectories in the reference case up to 2100. However, beyond 
2100, quadratic damages are far higher than threshold ones; this has significant consequences 
on abatement pathways. 
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To analyze the impacts of these mechanisms on the optimal pathway, we performed 
numerical experiments based on the RESPONSE_D/s variant of our generic model, in which 
the objective function (1a) is the maximization of the expected intertemporal (logarithmic) 
utility of income, Y, minus abatement costs, f(.) and resulting damages, Ψ(.): 
( ) (2300 1 1990
1990
( , , ) ( , )
ln
s
t
s s s
t t t t t
s t
Ab s t t
Y f Ab Ab t t
Max p N e
N
ηθ− − −
=
 − − Ψ   
∑ ∑ )
tY
 (1a) 
 
Damages functions are the following: 
quadratic damages function  threshold damages function 
( ) ( )2,s st tt aθ θΨ =    ( ) 2,
21
s
t
s s
t tK Z
K Z
dt b
e
e
θθ θ + −  − 
   Ψ = +  −  +     
tY
s
t t
                                                
 
with a=0.6%GWP, d=4% of GWP, e=0.01, Z=1.7°C, K=2.3°C, b=0.5 %GWP. 
 
As in earlier versions, learning process is represented by the following constraint (1b): 
( ) 'inf , , ' , sot t s s S Ab Ab∀ ≤ ∀ ∈ =     (1b) 
 
Figure 8 shows the optimal emission paths for quadratic (dashed grey curves) and threshold 
damage functions (grey curves) when learning on climate sensitivity occurs in 2020 or 2040. 
No direct policy conclusion can be derived from the comparison between both emissions 
paths6, since the ultimate damages levels for each shape are not equal. This explains why the 
abatement pathways are comparable in the early periods. The main information from this 
experiment is that, if information on climate sensitivity arrives later than 2030, threshold 
functions lead to higher abatement rates and that the value of information on climate 
sensitivity (Figure 9) increases very significantly. This is due to the fact that one gets close to 
the threshold, a mechanism which does not appear with quadratic functions. This confirms 
Peck and Teisberg findings [32] that the value of information gets higher the more non-linear 
damages are. In policy terms, this confirms the existence of a window of opportunity, already 
found in the cost-efficiency analysis with temperature ceiling and in the PCCR approach. 
 
 
6 In particular the fact that optimal emissions paths are similar until 2030 should be considered as a calibration 
artefact.  
 17 
46
8
10
12
14
16
18
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Emissions (GtC)
Baseline A1-m
Learning occurs
in 2020 in 2040
Quadratic 
Threshold
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Figure 9: Expected Value of Perfect Information on climate sensitivity for quadratic and 
threshold damage functions. 
 
5.3.3 Uncertainty regarding damage function when climate dynamics is known 
 
To analyze the specific importance of uncertainty on the shape of damage function, we 
calibrated both specifications on the same arbitrary benchmark value: 1% GWP loss for a 2°C 
temperature increase. Climate sensitivity is assumed to be known and set to its central value 
(3.5°C). Moreover, expected damages exhibit similar temporal trends at least during the first 
half of the current century. 
 
This comes to respecifying RESPONSE_D’/s objective function in the following manner. Ex 
ante subjective probabilities (ps) are assigned to two states of the world (s): either damages 
functions are quadratic (Q) or they exhibit threshold (T). To reflect the diversity of beliefs, we 
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have tested four sets of values for ps: {pQ=1, pT=0};{pQ=0.95, pT=0.05};{pQ=0.5, 
pT=0.5};{pQ=1, pT=0}. Objective function (1a) is the maximization, for each set of subjective 
probabilities, of expected intertemporal (logarithmic) utility of income, Y, minus abatement 
costs, f(.) and resulting damages, Ψ(.): 
( ) (2300 1 1990
1990
( , , ) ( , )
ln
s
t
s s s
t t t s t t
s t
Ab s t t
Y f Ab Ab t t
Max p N e
N
ηθ− − −
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 − − Ψ   
∑ ∑ )  (1a) 
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K Z
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t d Y s Threshold
e
e
θ
θ
θ
+ −  − 
 =  Ψ =   =  − +     
 
 
with a=0.25% of GWP, d=3% of GWP, e=0.01, Z=1.7°C, K=2.3°C, b=0.5 %GWP. 
 
As earlier, learning process is represented by the following constraint (1b): 
( ) 'inf , , ' , sot t s s S Ab Ab∀ ≤ ∀ ∈ = st t      (1b) 
 
Because quadratic functions refer to ultimate damages far higher than threshold functions, 
abatement rates are similar in the early decades. This is why results in Figure 10 show the 
same limitations than in Figure 9. However despite this artefact, abatement pathways diverge 
significantly if information is disclosed after 2030. After this date, the optimal pathways are 
critically dependent on the subjective probability sets: it is remarkable however that a 5% 
subjective probability only for the threshold function (upper dotted line) leads to a significant 
departure from the quadratic case while a 50/50 distribution of probabilities leads to emissions 
pathway very close to the optimal pathway in case of early certainty about the existence of the 
threshold. Here again, the worst case hypothesis dominates the result. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have compared optimal climate policy in the short run under three different 
decision-making frameworks: cost-effectiveness with temperature ceiling objectives, cost-
benefit analysis with pure preference for current climate regime and full cost-benefit approach 
with monetized evaluations of impacts. Five key lessons on short term decision emerge from 
this analysis. 
 
(a) Given the cascade of uncertainty from emissions to damages, the difference between 
various decision-making frameworks appears to matter less than the difference between 
stochastic and non stochastic approach. 
 
(b) In a stochastic approach, it is not necessary to assume ultimate catastrophic impacts to 
conclude to the optimality of early GHGs abatements. Singularities in the damage curves are 
sufficient to draw such a conclusion mainly because they increase the role of the uncertainty 
on climate sensitivity. In a stochastic framework, with uncertainty about the shape of the 
damage curve, the choice of the optimal strategy is dominated by the likelihood of occurrence 
of function with singularities. 
 
(c) In addition to the shape of damage curves, the optimal timing of emissions abatement is 
very sensitive to the way the carbon cycle, the climate sensitivity and baseline emissions over 
the first decades are calibrated, and to the extent to which their intrinsic uncertainty is 
considered. 
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(d) A window of opportunity exists in all decision-making frameworks, cost-benefit analysis 
with smooth damage curves excepted. The value of information is low in the first periods but 
increases drastically after 2020 to 2040. This time-horizon has to be compared with the fifty 
years necessary to change energy systems, and to the fact that, according to the climate 
models, clear signals may not emerge from the noise of climate variability before 2050.  
 
(e) The introduction of a pure preference for current climate allows for an overshoot of 
desired temperature (or concentration) targets without lowering the first period effort because 
it counterbalances the influence of discounting, all the more so as the environment is treated 
as a superior good.  
 
The core difficulties remain: a) the revelation of the pure preference for current climate 
regime (including its volatility due to the media life cycles), b) the evaluation of the interplay 
between the various influences of climate change on the economy. Among these interplays we 
will insist, as an invitation to further thoughts, on the role of the inertia and of the 
geographical distribution of damages. One major source of singularity in damage curves 
comes indeed from the joint effect of uncertainty and the inertia of human systems: a two 
percent of GDP loss may either represent a benign shock when spread over a century or a 
havoc when concentrated on five years (this is the cost of WW1 for France). Another related 
source of singularity is the propagation effect (climate refugees for example), in case of un-
compensated shocks at a local level. 
 
Coping with these difficulties will confront the methodological difficulties of incorporating 
intrinsically controversial information at various spatial scales, including information derived 
from ‘grass-root’ case studies, into an integrated modeling framework. The increase of the 
size of the models to be mobilized will make all the more necessary the development of 
compact models of the sort used in this paper. Both mathematically controllable and flexible 
enough, they are an appropriate communication tool between scientific disciplines and 
between science and stakeholders in a process of public decision-making under scientific 
controversy. 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
A.1. Baseline growth scenario and exogenous related data (income and population) 
 
All experiments are based on the SRES A1m scenario which has been computed by NIES 
(National Institute for Environmental Studies, Japan) with the AIM model (Asian Pacific 
Integrated Model) [33]. We choose the A1m scenario because it corresponds to rather 
optimistic beliefs about the future. A1m is indeed the picture of a prosperous and generous 
world where economic growth is high with a considerable catch-up of developing countries, 
continuous structural change and rapid diffusion of more efficient technologies yield to 
decreasing GHGs emissions as soon as 2050. A1m is thus consistent with beliefs such as “it is 
better to invest in R&D in the energy sector and/or research in climate change-related fields 
than to deep-cut fossil fuel emissions at once while alternative technologies are expensive and 
climate change consequences might prove ultimately benign” or “abatement opportunity cost 
is lower than that of fostering development in potential vulnerable regions”. It is therefore 
relevant to examine how statements like “one should delay GHGs emissions reduction 
efforts” are to be revised when using a proper precautionary approach. 
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A.2. Specification of abatement cost function 
 
We use the following abatement cost function: 
( ) ( 31 11( , , ) . . , . .3t t t t t t tf Ab Ab t BK PT Ab Ab em Abγ− −= )  
with: f(Abt,Abt-1,t) total cost of mitigation measures at time t (trillion US$) 
BK  initial marginal cost of backstop technology (thousand US$.tC-1) 
 PTt  technical change factor 
 γ(Abt,Abt-1) socio-economic inertia factor 
 emt  baseline CO2 emissions at time t (GtC) 
 Abt  abatement rate at time t (% of baseline emissions) 
 
Under these specifications, marginal costs of abatament are convex (quadratic). This is 
consistent with assumptions by experts and the results of technico-economic models. Note 
that f(.) does not allow for so-called no-regret potential. 
 
BK stands for the initial marginal cost of backstop technology, ie the carbon free-technology 
which would enable to completely reduce GHGs emissions were it to be substituted to current 
existing energy systems. Its value depends on a set of assumptions regarding its nature 
(windpower, nuclear, …), its development date, its penetration rate and technical change. 
Given our own assumptions on technical change, we retain an initial 1,100US$.tC-1 cost. 
 
PTt captures the influence of autonomous technical change on abatement costs. It translates 
the decrease of the costs of carbon-free technology over time, but the improvement of energy 
intensity which is already taken into account in the baseline. We assume that the costs of 
abatement technologies decrease at a constant 1% per year rate but we assume costs cannot 
decrease beyond 25% of their initial values. PTt thus take the form below (which leads to an 
ultimate cost of 275 US$.tC-1) 
  0.010.25 0.75 ttPT e
δ−= +
where: δ is the time step of the model (10 years) 
 
γ(Abt,Abt-1) captures the influence of socio-economic inertia as a cost-multiplier (transition 
costs between a more and a less carbon-intensive economic structure). γ(.) is a multiplicative 
index. It is equal to 1 (no additional costs) if abatement increases at a rate lower than a given 
threshold τ between two consecutive periods. But it increases linearly with the speed of 
variation of abatement rate when this rate is higher than τ, i.e. the annual turnover of 
productive capital below which mitigation policies do not lead to premature retirement of 
productive units. Here τ is set to 5% per year (average capital stocks turnover of 20 years). 
 ( )
1
1
1
1 1
,
t t
t t
t t
Ab Abif
Ab Ab
Ab Ab otherwise
δτγ
δτ
−
−
−
− ≤=  −
 
 
A.3. Three-reservoir linear carbon-cycle model 
 
We use the C-Cycle of Nordhaus [12], a linear three-reservoir model (atmosphere, biosphere 
+ surface ocean and deep ocean). Each reservoir is assumed to be homogenous (well-mixed in 
the short run) and is characterised by a residence time inside the box and corresponding 
 22 
mixing rates with the two other reservoirs (longer timescales). Carbon flows between 
reservoirs depend on constant transfert coefficients. GHGs emissions (CO2 solely) accumulate 
in the atmosphere and they are slowly removed by biospheric and oceanic sinks.  
 
The dynamics of carbon flows is given by is given by: 
1
1
1
. (1 )
t t
t trans t t t
t t
A A
B C B Ab em
O O
δ
+
+
+
      = + −         
.u

 
with At carbon contents of atmosphere at time t (GtC) 
Bt carbon contents of upper ocean and biosphere at time t (GtC) 
Ot carbon contents of deep ocean at time t (GtC) 
Ctrans net transfert coefficients matrix 
u column vector (1,0,0) 
 
As such, the model has a built-in ten-year lag between CO2 emissions and CO2 accumulation 
in the atmosphere, which reflects the inertia in C-cycle dynamics. Nordhaus calibration on 
existing carbon-cycle models gives the following results (for a decadal time step): 
0.66616 0.27607 0
0.33384 0.60897 0.00422   
0 0.11496 0.99578
transC
 =   
 initial conditions (GtC):C  1990
758
793
19230
  =    
 
The main criticism which may be addressed to this C-cycle model is that the transfer 
coefficients are constant. In particular, they do not depend on the carbon content of the 
reservoir (e.g. deforestation hindering biospheric sinks) nor are they influenced by ongoing 
climatic change (eg positive feedbacks between climate change and carbon cycle). 
 
A.4. The reduced-form climate model7 
 
This model is very close to Schneider and Thompson’s two-box model [34]. A set of two 
equations is used to describe global mean temperature variation (eq. 2) since pre-industrial 
times in response to additional human-induced forcing (eq. 1). More precisely, the model 
describes the modification of the thermal equilibrium between atmosphere and surface ocean 
in response to anthropogenic greenhouse effect. Calibration was carried out with H. Le Treut 
(IPSL) from data kindly provided by P. Friedlingstein (IPSL). 
 
All specifications correspond to decadal values, which is the time step of the model. 
 
Radiative forcing Equation: 
 2
log
( )
log 2
t
PI
X
M
M
F t F
  = 
                                                
     (1) 
with           Mt: CO2 atmospheric concentration at time t (ppm) 
 F(t): radiative forcing at time t (W.m-2) 
  MPI: CO2 atmospheric concentration at pre-industrial times, set at 280 ppm. 
  F2X: instantaneous radiative forcing for 2x MPI, set at 3.71 W.m-2. 
 
7 A more precise description of the model and calibration process may be found in [17]. 
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Temperature increase Equation: 
 
   (2) 1 2 1 2 1
3 3
( 1) 1 ( ) ( 1) ( )
( 1) 1 ( 1) 0
At At
Oc Oc
t t F t
t t
θ σ λ σ σ σ θ σθ σ σ θ
 + − + +        = +      + − +        
 
with θAt(t): global mean atmospheric temperature rise wrt pre-industrial times (°C)  
            θOc(t): global mean oceanic temperature rise wrt pre-industrial times (°C)  
 
and λ: climate response parameter (C-1.W.m-2) 
 σ1: transfert coefficient (set at 0.479 C.W-1.m2)  
 σ2: transfert coefficient (set at 0.109 C-1.W.m-2)  
 σ3: transfert coefficient (set at 0.131) 
 
Climate sensitivity (T2x) is given by T2x= F2X / λ. We assume that uncertainty is mainly due to 
uncertainty on (atmospheric) climate feedbacks process (represented by λ) rather than 
uncertainty on F2X. A high climate response parameter will lead to a low climate sensitivity. 
We explore three values for climate sensitivity and λ is set accordingly to F2x/T2X see 
following table: 
 
State of the World LOW CENTRAL HIGH 
Climate sensitivity (T2x) 2.5°C 3.5°C 4.5°C 
Ex ante subjective 
probability (ps) 
1/6 2/3 1/6 
λ 1,48 1,06 0,82 
 
A.5. Numerical resolution 
 
To avoid boundary effects, we did not specify terminal conditions in 2100 but set the time 
horizon of the model at 2300. All the models have been run under the GAMS-MINOS non-
linear solver. The model codes are available from the authors on request. 
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